Human geography or anthropogeography is the branch of geography which studies spatial relationships between human communities, cultures, economies, and their interactions with the environment, examples of which include urban sprawl and urban redevelopment.

Definition

“Human geography is the synthetic study of relationship between human societies and earth’s surface”. – Friedrich Ratzel

Human geography studies the inter-relationship between the physical environment and socio-cultural environment created by human beings through mutual interaction with each other.

Neo-determinism

Humanism

Humanistic approach to study man and environment relationship emerged in 1960s as a critical reaction against positivism. Humanistic approach developed just because of the dissatisfaction developed due to the mechanistic model of spatial science that had developed during the quantitative revolution. The followers of positivistic approach and spatial science treated human beings as dots on map and data on graph and number in equation. Since the focus of humanistic approach was to keep role of human at the center point and it emphasizes the role of human awareness, human agency, human consciousness and human creativity this is the reason why humanistic approach was supported by Kirk (1951) focusing on the complexity and ambiguity of relationship between man and environment. The central idea of this theme was that the tools and assumption of the quantitative revolution were not able to explain human world and human issues specially those related to social institutions, attitudes, morals, traditions and aesthetics. This philosophy of man and environment relationship rejects the reduction of space and place to geometrical concepts.

Introduction

In the history of geographical thinking, human – nature dialogue has been studied and analyzed from a number of different perspectives and views. The first amongst these approaches to deliberate on the human-nature relationship was determinism. In the words of Platt (1948) determinism, refers to the idea that everything in human life is caused inevitably by previous events or conditions. The primary initial source of determinists for an explanation was the physical environment, and the theoretical order was centered on the belief that the human activity was controlled by the parameters of the environment which was their habitat. Determinism is one of the most important philosophies, which continued in one form or other till World War II. In the context of this paradigm, it is believed that due to the difference in the natural environment, the variations in human behaviour in different parts of the world can be described. The spirit of deterministic ideology is that the level of development of history, culture, lifestyle and social group or nation is solely governed by the physical components of the environment at any scale.

Determinists generally consider humans as a passive agent on whom physical factors are working continuously and thus determine their approach and decision-making process. In short, the determinists believe that most human activities can be explained as a response to the natural environment.

The Path of Determinism in Geography

To understand determinism and why it became an ideological pariah in human geography, it is imperative to consider its historical context.

In the context of the effect of natural conditions, the first attempt was made by Greek and Roman scholars explaining the physical characteristics and character traits of different people and their culture. At that time this effort was not contained only among geographers rather included scholars from different fields like the doctor Hippocrates, philosopher Aristotle, and Historians Thucydides, Polybius, and Herodotus. In the Greco-Roman era, regional studies were closely tied with the study of history; Thucydides and Polybius saw Athens’s natural conditions and geographical position as factors for its greatness. For example, Aristotle explained the difference between Northern Europe and Asian people in the context of climate causes, while explaining the greatness and greatness of Rome, while mentioning similar incidents of Strabo.

Strabo argued that the cold weather in Europe was the reason for their bravery. Aristotle thought that people living in hot weather in Asia were wise but there was a lack of soul and therefore time to time subjected to slavery. Because humans often consider their home as the best place, it is not surprising that Aristotle believed that the best combination of all possible worlds was in the centre of space, Greece (Glacon, 1967). Aristotle strongly advocated the progress of some countries is the result of their favorable environmental conditions.

In the Middle Ages, Montesquieu explained that in cold weather people are less physically strong, more courageous, clear, less susceptible and less cunning than those in hot weather. He quotes that people in hot weather are terrible, weak in body, dull and inactive. Deterministic approach dominated the writings of Arab scholars. They divided the world into seven terrestrial zones on the basis of climate and highlighted the physical and cultural characteristics of the castes and castes of these regions. Al-Baruni, Al-Masudi, Ibn Hawkal, Al-Idrisi and Ibn Khaldun attempted to correlate the environment with human activities and living conditions within the conceptual domain of determinism.

In the eighteenth century, historian George Tatham, also explained the differences among the people, in relation to the differences between the countries in which they lived. Kant was also a determinant who had said that people of New-Holland (East Indies) kept half-closed eyes and till they did not touch their back, they would not see their head at any distance without bending. Thomas Malthus was a scientific determinant (1766-1834) he not only emphasized the effect of different environments but also emphasized the boundaries that were imposed on social milieu because of these different environments.

Deterministic reasoning continued in the 19th century when geography itself was related to other sciences. Carl Ritter, a German geographer adopted an anti-human approach and laid the philosophical base of determinism in geography. Ritter tried to make a difference in the physical constitution of the body, body, and health of men living in the different physical environment. Many of his students considered geography as “a study of the relationship between people’s density and the nature of their land”. Many geographers of their school had declared that their main task was to identify the influence of physical cultural geographical conditions and the political fortunes of residents of any area in both East and present. Alexander von Humboldt, one of the founders of ‘Modern Geography’ and a contemporary of Ritter, also said that the life of the residents of a hill country is different from those in the plains.

In the latter part of the 19th century and early decades of the 20th century, the scientific environment was dominated by the views of Darwin and the acceptance of Newton’s cause and effect relations. The origins of scientific determinism are in the work of Charles Darwin, whose original book The Origin of Species (1859) influenced many geographers. The influence of evolutionary biology on the development of modern geographic thought is now widely accepted. Stoddart (1966) argues that Darwin’s biology played the crucial role in establishing the human’s place in nature, making possible the very development of geography as a science. The organismic analogy overcame the methodological problems inherent in the study of human environment relations, the dualism between natural and human phenomena (Stoddart 1967). 

At the end of the 20th century, in American geography, the prevalent view that well fitted into the intellectual environment was the doctrine of determinism. Most of these were influenced by Darwin’s ideas which were further developed by William Morris Davis during the cycle of erosion model. The primary concern was with documenting the control or influence of the environment on human society.

Friedrich Ratzel, the founder of ‘new’ determinism, supplemented the ‘classical’ geographical determinism with the elements of ‘Social Darwinism’ and developed the state’s theory as an organism. He believed in the existence of a qualification and saw the ‘man’ as the end product of development – a development which was natural selection of type according to the ability to adjust itself to the physical environment of the environment. He along with his disciple Ellen Churchill Semple became the most vocal expression of the deterministic approach in geography.

Semple in her book Influences of Geographical Environment (1911) writes: Man is a product of the surface of the Earth; this book had a widespread, long-lasting use in geographic education (Wright 1966). She dominated the environmentalist period of the discipline in the early twentieth century (Hartshorne 1939) and “trained a large proportion of those who became leaders of the profession during the period between the two World Wars” (James, Bladen and Karan 1983). Her essential scientific position was as follows: ‘in every problem of history, there are two main factors, variously stated as heredity and environment, man and his geographic conditions, the internal forces of race and the external forces of habitat. Now the geographic element in the long history of human development has been operating strongly and operating persistently. Herein lies it’s importance. It is a stable force. It never sleeps. This natural environment, this physical basis of history, is for all intents and purposes immutable in comparison with the other factor in the problem-shifting, plastic, progressive, retrogressive man’ (Semple 1911).

Her methodological statement cannot be questioned as at one time she points out that the influence of climate on man both as a direct and indirect effect cannot be questioned. She further elaborates that man was a passive subject who bears direct environmental influence at early stages of development. As they became more active, the indirect influences that mold’s his mind and character through the medium of his economic and social life became more important. Through her writings, she explained national superiority in the new terms of natural “science,” by providing an environmental version of “scientific racism” (Peet, 1985). The doctrine was further established by Ellsworth Huntington and Griffith Taylor. Huntington in his book ‘The Principles of Human Geography’ (1945) and articles on climate and civilization demonstrated man’s preference for ethnic-type structures and environmentalist explanations. However, he repeatedly repeated the importance of a genetic constitution and threw his weight behind various genetic enterprises (Spate, 1968). He took the most decisive step since the time of Hippocrates and decided to make some results in the thinking of environmental causes. 

Taylor (1880-1963) was more cautious in relating man and environment. He believed that the environment has set the limits of human development. Their determinism was compared to the traffic control system, which set the rate, but did not give the direction of progress, which came to be known as Neo-determinism or Stop and Go Determinism. He states that man is able to speed, slow or stop the speed of any country’s (regional) development. But he should not be, if he is intelligent, departing from the instructions according to the natural environment. He (man) is like a traffic controller in a big city, which changes the rate but does not give the direction of progress.

In later year’s geographers Mackinder, Chisholm, Davis, Bowman, Robert Mill, Geddes, Sauer, Hebertson, Taylor etc., explained the progress of society with a deterministic approach. Many scholars have clearly made it clear that climate has affected the soil’s physical properties, which ultimately determines the crop pattern, which depends on the habits, function, and behaviour of the residents’ diet. The determinists over the years had assured that there is a great impact of the physical features of the location of the people in relation to the mountains and plains at the level of their life and its level of development.

Surprisingly scholars were not adhered to this paradigm because of its power of scientific persuasion. Rather they were trying to explain the new “scientific” terms of environmental causation within the ambit of geographical thinking – hence the focus on geographic determinants of society and history. But it had its limitations; its failure to realize the reflective differences between human beings and the rest of nature. Man through his social environment and productive capacity has the ability of development. Moreover, human consciousness makes this process to be selfdirected; the result is a confrontation between natural determination and social determination.

To include human social science, the natural theory needs to be amended. The organismic analogy on which the entire epitome of determinism was erected proved incapable of providing the basis for such a human-oriented theory, yet the analogy persisted because it proved a convenient methodological tool in legitimation theory.

Criticisms

After World War II, this philosophy was vehemently criticized in the United States, UK, Canada and many other countries. Geographers observed that this approach exaggerated the active role of nature while interpreting human history. The determinists only consider humans capable of being adapted but man’s efforts reveal many facts which the forces of the environment cannot explain. The does do not only become socially dysfunctional but was also subjected to an academic, theoretical critique. Barrows (1923) initiated a meek criticism from within the environmentalist paradigm where he argues that the relations between man and environment should be seen from the standpoint of human adjustment as this was “more likely to result in the recognition and proper valuation of all the factors involved, and especially to minimize the danger of assigning to the environmental factors a determinative influence which they do not exert.” 

Sauer (1963) had a stronger reservation where he states that a transposition of divine law into omnipotent natural law had caused the “eager adherents of the faith of causation” to sacrifice their earlier concerns in the name of a “rigorous dogma of naturalistic cosmology, most notably in American physiography and anthropogeography”. As he later added, “natural law does not apply to social groups” (Sauer 1963); instead what man did in an area involves the active agency of culture that shapes of the landscape. Sauer’s critique played the internal role in diminishing the place of determinism as the hegemonic theory of geography and initiated redefinition as a “social science, concerned with areal differentiation.

Now the question arises that did Sauer provided a valid alternative theoretical base to the geographical thinking. Peet (1985) states that the cultural geography of Blache and Sauer failed to establish a comprehensive theory within the discipline. In the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s geography drifted towards a regional perspective as determinism was being critiqued without being effectively replaced. The chorological concept logically implies that relationships do not define the field. Whatever be the goal of the geographer, he should not be limited to or prejudiced against any particular technique or method. Literary description and levels of human insight are undoubtedly required, but in Hartshorne’s (1939) words the geographer must analyze the relationships of earthly features, “regardless of whether these interrelations can be described in terms of ‘natural laws’ or ‘social laws.’ Therefore, determinism has not retreated from geography; rather, a number of deterministic systems have been evolved to assist the interpretation of spatial patterns, and have frequently been compressed into mathematical formulae. There is sufficient room for analysis of both physical and cultural factors, quantitative laws and artistic synthesis. Determinism was redefined, refined, reviewed, and redirected, but never completely dislodged.

Conclusions

To conclude, we have to answer a question that why, after years of scientific criticism determinism as a viable scientific approach appears to live on? The most simplistic answer would be that the alternatives to determinism were less than satisfactory. Though there were potential replacements for determinism in the form of environmentalism, possibilism, probabilism, cultural ecology, and chorology. Among these, the most prominent were possibilism and probabilism, each of which presumed that humans were free agents who made choices from the innumerable factors available in the environment (Hartshorne, 1966).

Secondly, beliefs consistent with determinism continued to be as widely accepted as understandable ways of explaining complex and variable factors that underscored various social and cultural phenomena. Although, modern science viewed traditional environmental determinism as overly simplistic, teleological, and even racist, there have to be reasons why the public accepted deterministic explanations for complex social phenomena. 

Thirdly, in the words of carter (1964), although geographers have turned away from environmentalism to a more balanced view, allied fields of knowledge are all too often still following along in the deterministic paths marked out fifty years ago. When history, economics, and political science, even on the college level, refer to geographic factors, all too often they take a strong physical environmental determinist view; geography cannot simply overlook it.

Interestingly it also became clear that determinists were in agreement at two points. Firstly no one ever stated that humans did not have the ability to choose from among the alternatives offered in the environment (James and Martin, 1981). Secondly, nor was there ever any significant argument that no other factors were at play in the development of human societies. In fact, no interpretation in the history of geography ever came close to the rigorous environmental determinism (Beck, 1985).

The Possibilistic Perspective

The doctrine of possibilism tries to explain the relationship of a human being with the environment in a different way; it puts human at a higher level and regards it as an active agent. It is a principle which claims that environment provides opportunities and man being an economic man chooses from those possibilities. Febvre (1932) in ‘A Geographical Introduction to History’ stated ‘there are no necessities, but everywhere possibilities; and man, as the master of these possibilities, is the judge of their users’.

The roots of possibilism can be traced back to the works of Plato, who is considered the master of deductive reasoning. Though his idea went into gloom for hundreds of years; the contrasting doctrine of determinism continued to grow and flourished. It got support in the writings of French scholar of the eighteenth century – Montesquieu, who is credited with developing a doctrine analogous to modern paradigm of possibilism. He opined that man possesses free will and has the ability to choose from a series of opportunities. Similar thoughts were also put forward by another eighteenth-century French philosopher, Comte de Buffon. He believed that man was ordered to conquer the earth and even transform it. Their views laid the base for crypto-possibilistic hypothesis (Adhikari, 2010).

It was only in the latter half of the nineteenth century that under the leadership of Vidal De la Blache (1845 – 1918), a possibilistic view of man-environment developed. The focus of this philosophy was “Nature has set boundaries and has provided possibilities for human settlement, but the way a person responds to these conditions or adjusts it depends on the traditional way of life.” Vidal rejected the concept of material determinism and advocated favourability. He even rejected Durkheim’s opinion of human geography as social morphology rather insisted that man was a partner and not a slave of the environment (Dikshit, 2009). He was critical of Darwinian-Ratzelian heritage which proposed environmental determinism and put forth the concept of possibilism. He sought a scheme for understanding the interaction of nature and culture that eschewed both environmental determinism and radical possibilism to seek answers or solution for the dichotomy between the human and the environment.

In the twentieth century, possibilism got stronghold after the publication of Blache’s article in 1913 where he categorically states that geography as a discipline seeks to measure and role of man in modifying the earth surface. This was further strengthened when his book was published in 1921 (English translation in 1926), though posthumously. He observes that nature gives man materials which have their inherent needs as well as limitations thus leading them to limited uses.

Possibilism was further flourished by acclaimed historian Lucien Febvre (1878-1956). He puts forward – “Whatever the men do in their own environment, they cannot completely get rid of themselves completely.” Febvre emphasized human initiative and motivation against the environment, destroying the environmental deterministic reasoning and as part of the environment of any group, as well as other humans, because they belong to the next group’s cultural surroundings, or the constraints of the environment are influenced by such thinking. He stated that in the view of possibilists, a homogeneous region does not necessarily result in a homogeneous society. This is because people residing in any area have the choice of possibilities time to time and also in the quantity they want.

Bruhnes followed Blache’s ideas and took it to next step, he not only transmitted Blache’s philosophy in France but also disseminated it to different parts of the world. In 1910, his monumental work La Geographie de L’Histoire was published.

Barrows, in his presidential address (1922), recommended that relationships in geography should be studied “from man’s adjustment to environment, rather than the reverse”. Hettner (1907) also supported the concept of geography as the study of relationship.

Thus, both the physical factors and the human factors (cultural environment) are to be studied in their relations to each other.

Cultural or Social Determinism

Cultural or social determinism emphasizes the human element: “Our thoughts determine our actions, and our actions determine the nature of the world’s last” (James, 1932: 318). Since there is a difference in human interest, desires, prejudices and group values, therefore there is a difference in the level of cultural landscape and socio-economic development. The amendment of an environment depends on our perception, thoughts and decision-making processes.

This philosophy made by American scholars can be explained in principle, according to which “the significance of man’s physical and biological features of his residence is an act of man’s own views, objectives, and technical skills”. For example, a country that is financed by a hunter’s perspective can be poor for an agricultural person; The importance of coal is not the same as those who can not use it. All these truths are self-evident. It is also true that as technology develops, the importance of the environment is not reduced, but the change becomes more complex.

The philosophy of cultural determinism is quite broad among American geographers. For example, Eduard Wellman wrote that “the environment is essentially neutral, its role depends on the level of technology, the type of culture and the other characteristics of the changing society”. For example, mountain pass estimation, which is for horses, automobiles, airplanes, will be different for them; Assessment of fertility of soil will not be similar to the perspective of a Japanese farmer, on the other hand, or an Amazonian Indian. Similar natural conditions can say different reactions on human part, and in similar circumstances, different cultures can occur. George Carter is out of three fundamental factors in human geography, he has given more emphasis on cultural forces and wrote that “staying as a primary reason for changing the ideas …, these are the ideas that determine the human use of the physical world We do”. He also said that human beings are the decisive factor.

After World War II, schools of social determinism became very popular in Austria, Holland, and Sweden. Social geography relates to the spatial distribution of society. This, however, is not able to gain a deeper understanding of social relations or landscape. Social groups can be isolated in the context of ethnic, religious, professional and some other characteristics, whereas social change is only mentioned, but seldom is associated with any fundamental economic causes or society’s class structure.

The study of the effect implemented by these groups on the scenario reduces in the definition of purely external factors of the cultural landscape (deployment and deployment of homes, land uses, type patterns etc.), which in the form of morphology and Under the functional changes, boundaries of the same road are infinitely the use of such ‘macro-regional’ research is usually used in the character. Motivated and cannot provide any basis of Scientific findings of real importance. Thus social or cultural determinism does not adequately assess environmental factors, that is, the effect of the natural environment on ‘cultural geographical differences’. Thus, social determinism is thus rigorous as the environmental fatalism and therefore cannot be accepted in its raw form.

To sum up, the major debate among the geographical thinkers is whether people are an active or passive agent in the man-nature relationships. The entire debate revolves around two issues – Firstly, resource exploitation is inevitable for the survival of human beings which means that he will take more and return less. Secondly, there is hope that morality will win as human beings will vote for greater gains than meager personal benefits. The doctrine of sustainable development leads towards both these issues as it is based on the theme that development means meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs (Report on World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987).

Possibilism is a concept in geography that emerged as a counter to environmental determinism. It posits that, while the environment provides opportunities and sets certain constraints, human beings possess the freedom and capability to make choices and shape their environment to fulfill their needs and aspirations. The French geographer Paul Vidal de la Blache was a key proponent of this theory, arguing that human actions are not solely determined by nature, but rather that culture, society, and human creativity play a vital role in shaping responses to environmental challenges.

Merits of Possibilism

Promotes Human Agency and Freedom
Possibilism emphasizes human agency, suggesting that people are not bound by their environment but have the freedom to make choices and innovate. This view empowers humans to see themselves as active agents capable of modifying their surroundings to meet their needs. This is in stark contrast to environmental determinism, which implies that humans are simply products of their environment. By focusing on the possibilities available, Possibilism encourages individuals and societies to take control of their destinies and seek solutions to environmental challenges.

Encourages Technological and Scientific Progress
By asserting that humans can overcome environmental obstacles, Possibilism supports and encourages scientific research and technological advancements. This mindset has driven human societies to develop technologies that allow them to transform hostile environments into habitable spaces. For example, modern irrigation techniques have enabled agriculture in arid regions, and desalination technology has allowed societies to create drinkable water from seawater. The concept of Possibilism aligns with a progressive outlook that fosters continuous innovation to overcome natural constraints.

Flexibility in Understanding Human-Environment Interaction
Possibilism provides a flexible framework for understanding human-environment interaction, acknowledging that the environment influences human behavior but does not dictate it. This adaptability allows for the recognition of diverse responses to environmental challenges. For example, different societies may respond uniquely to similar environmental conditions based on cultural values, social structures, and available resources. Possibilism, therefore, accommodates a pluralistic approach that accounts for a variety of human responses to the same environmental factors.

Supports Cultural and Social Diversity
Since Possibilism places a strong emphasis on cultural adaptation and social factors, it acknowledges and supports cultural diversity. This perspective recognizes that societies are not only shaped by their physical surroundings but also by their historical, cultural, and social values. This diversity can be seen in architecture, food, clothing, and agricultural practices across the world. For example, rice cultivation in Asia and wheat farming in Europe reflect not only the environmental conditions but also the cultural preferences and practices developed over centuries. Possibilism allows for these varied ways of life to be recognized and valued as legitimate responses to environmental challenges.

Relevant to Modern Sustainable Development Goals
Possibilism aligns with the principles of sustainable development by encouraging humans to use resources responsibly while considering the long-term impacts of their actions on the environment. By focusing on choices and responsible resource management, Possibilism advocates for development strategies that balance human needs with ecological health. For instance, renewable energy projects, such as wind and solar power, are examples of human innovation that respects environmental limits while providing sustainable solutions. This alignment with sustainable practices makes Possibilism highly relevant in today’s context of global environmental concerns.

Reflects Real-World Examples
There are numerous real-world examples that support the Possibilist perspective, showing how human ingenuity can transform landscapes and defy environmental limitations. Cities like Dubai, built in an arid desert, and Singapore, with limited land and natural resources, demonstrate that with vision, technology, and effective planning, humans can overcome natural constraints. These examples validate the optimistic outlook of Possibilism and show that humans can develop and prosper in almost any environment if the necessary resources and ingenuity are applied.

Demerits of Possibilism

Overemphasis on Human Power and Innovation
A significant criticism of Possibilism is its overemphasis on human ability to modify the environment, potentially leading to an underestimation of environmental limitations. While it is true that technology has allowed humans to overcome many environmental challenges, there are still natural limits that cannot be fully bypassed. For example, the Amazon Rainforest or the Arctic ecosystems have delicate balances that, if disturbed excessively, could lead to disastrous consequences. Possibilism sometimes overlooks the fact that certain environments are too sensitive to withstand intensive human alteration, which can lead to environmental degradation.

Potential for Environmental Exploitation
Possibilism can foster an attitude that encourages humans to alter their environment freely, often leading to unsustainable practices. When humans view environmental challenges as obstacles to be overcome, they may adopt practices that exploit natural resources irresponsibly. This mindset has led to deforestation, mining, overfishing, and other destructive activities that harm ecosystems. In contrast, approaches that respect environmental limitations might advocate for conservation rather than alteration, which Possibilism may not always prioritize.

Ignores Certain Environmental Constraints
Possibilism tends to minimize the role of environmental constraints by focusing on human agency. However, certain natural phenomena, such as natural disasters, can drastically impact human life and limit the choices available to people. Events like earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes serve as reminders that nature retains power over human societies, regardless of technological advancements. Possibilism’s focus on human adaptability sometimes overlooks these instances where the environment remains a dominant force, restricting or shaping human choices.

Cultural and Social Bias
Possibilism was initially developed in a Western context, where technological advancement and scientific progress were prioritized. This has led some critics to argue that Possibilism has an inherent Western cultural bias, implying that technological progress is a universal solution. This perspective may overlook traditional or indigenous knowledge systems that emphasize harmony with nature over altering it. In some cultures, the relationship with the environment is deeply spiritual and conservative, valuing preservation rather than modification. Possibilism, with its focus on transformation, might not fully recognize these different worldviews.

Lack of Emphasis on Environmental Preservation
Possibilism encourages humans to alter their environment to meet their needs, which can sometimes conflict with the goals of environmental preservation. By promoting human choices and innovations, Possibilism may inadvertently encourage activities that harm the natural balance and lead to loss of biodiversity. For instance, industrial farming, though innovative, has often resulted in soil depletion and habitat destruction. The emphasis on human ability to change the environment can overshadow the need to maintain the integrity of natural ecosystems.

Neglects the Role of Geographical Determinants in Shaping Development
Possibilism sometimes minimizes the impact of geographic factors on development. For example, countries with limited access to natural resources or difficult terrains face unique developmental challenges that cannot always be overcome by human innovation alone. Some regions struggle with structural issues—such as lack of freshwater resources or rugged mountainous terrain—that fundamentally shape their economic and social development. In these cases, the environment remains a crucial factor in determining development, which Possibilism may downplay.

Conclusion

Possibilism is a significant and influential concept in geographical thought that challenges the notion of environmental determinism by emphasizing human agency and creativity. Its merits lie in its optimistic view of human potential, its encouragement of technological and scientific progress, and its recognition of cultural diversity. By viewing the environment as a canvas rather than a controlling force, Possibilism empowers societies to strive for progress, regardless of natural constraints, and aligns well with sustainable development goals.

However, Possibilism also has limitations. Its emphasis on human adaptability can lead to environmental exploitation and overlook natural limits. It may also carry a Western bias that does not always resonate with cultures that prioritize harmony with the environment. Moreover, by focusing on human agency, it can sometimes downplay the importance of environmental preservation and the power of geographical factors in shaping human activity.

Neo-Determinism is a geographical concept that merges aspects of both environmental determinism and possibilism. This theory, proposed by the German geographer Griffith Taylor, holds that while the environment sets certain constraints or limitations, humans still have agency to decide how to respond to these constraints. Neo-Determinism suggests that human activities are limited by natural factors, but within these limits, society can innovate and work around environmental challenges to achieve development. This balance between environmental limitations and human agency provides an insightful way of understanding the relationship between humans and their environment.

Merits of Neo-Determinism

1. Balanced Perspective
   Neo-Determinism offers a balanced approach by integrating environmental constraints with human agency. Unlike pure environmental determinism, which claims that the environment solely shapes human actions, Neo-Determinism acknowledges that humans are not merely passive recipients of environmental influences. By allowing room for human innovation and decision-making within environmental constraints, it aligns closer with reality than deterministic views that ignore human adaptability.

2. Encourages Sustainable Development
   Neo-Determinism encourages sustainable practices by highlighting the role of environmental limits in shaping human activities. Recognizing these boundaries promotes a conservationist mindset, pushing societies toward sustainable use of resources. For example, in regions with scarce water resources, Neo-Determinism would advocate for efficient water usage and conservation rather than excessive exploitation. This approach can guide policymakers to adopt practices that balance development and conservation, ensuring long-term environmental sustainability.

3. Adapts to Modern Technological Advancements
   With the rise of technology and scientific advancements, humans have been able to overcome many environmental barriers, such as creating desalination plants in arid regions or developing drought-resistant crops. Neo-Determinism accommodates such advancements by allowing for human agency within environmental boundaries. This flexibility supports the idea that while environmental challenges exist, they can be mitigated or adapted to, fostering a progressive view of development.

4. Reflects Real-World Examples
   Neo-Determinism is grounded in observable realities. For instance, in desert regions like Israel and parts of the Middle East, harsh environmental conditions have spurred innovation in agriculture and water management, resulting in successful, modern societies. The greenhouses and drip irrigation systems in these regions exemplify how humans work within environmental constraints to achieve remarkable advancements. This adaptability shows that Neo-Determinism has a practical basis and applies to real-world scenarios.

5. Promotes Responsible Environmental Management
   Neo-Determinism also emphasizes responsibility toward the environment. By recognizing that natural resources are finite, it advocates for cautious and well-thought-out utilization of environmental resources. This view contrasts with purely possibilist perspectives that focus solely on human innovation without adequate regard for environmental consequences. Neo-Determinism, therefore, supports a holistic approach to development that takes into account the ecological impacts of human actions.

Demerits of Neo-Determinism

1. Underestimates Human Agency in Extreme Conditions
   Neo-Determinism may place excessive emphasis on environmental constraints, potentially limiting the perceived scope of human agency in extreme conditions. Critics argue that in areas with severe environmental challenges—such as polar regions—technological and social advancements can significantly reduce the role of environmental limits. Possibilism suggests that human creativity can overcome almost any environmental limitation, a perspective that Neo-Determinism does not fully support. This criticism highlights a potential underestimation of human capability in extreme environments.

2. Potential for Pessimism in Development Goals
   By emphasizing environmental constraints, Neo-Determinism can create a pessimistic outlook on development in certain regions. For example, if policymakers accept environmental limitations as an insurmountable barrier, it could stifle ambitious projects and innovation. This perspective may prevent countries or regions from exploring more aggressive development strategies and pursuing economic growth in areas deemed environmentally challenging. This conservatism might lead to underutilization of potential resources.

3. Limited Application in Highly Developed Regions
   In highly developed areas where technology minimizes environmental constraints, Neo-Determinism appears less relevant. For instance, densely populated urban areas like Tokyo or New York City thrive despite numerous natural challenges. Advanced infrastructure and technology mitigate issues like natural disasters, limited land, and resource scarcity. Neo-Determinism’s emphasis on environmental limits may not adequately account for the ability of highly industrialized societies to alter or transform their environments to meet human needs.

4. Lack of Consideration for Social and Cultural Factors
   Neo-Determinism primarily focuses on the environmental and technological dimensions of human development, often sidelining social, cultural, and political factors. These factors can be equally significant in determining how societies develop and adapt. For instance, cultural attitudes toward nature, political stability, and economic policies can strongly influence how a society interacts with its environment. Neo-Determinism may not fully capture the complex interplay of social, cultural, and environmental factors, thus limiting its explanatory power.

5. Risk of Over-Simplification
   In attempting to provide a middle ground, Neo-Determinism can oversimplify complex human-environment interactions by framing them in terms of constraints and choices. Critics argue that human-environment relations are far more intricate and cannot be reduced to a binary of environmental limits versus human choice. By framing these interactions in relatively straightforward terms, Neo-Determinism might miss out on more nuanced insights into how societies respond to their environments in diverse ways.

Conclusion

Neo-Determinism represents a significant evolution in geographical thought by balancing environmental determinism with possibilism. It recognizes the agency of humans within a framework of environmental constraints, advocating a middle path between passive environmental dependence and unlimited human creativity. This balanced approach supports sustainable development, responsible environmental management, and the prudent use of resources, making it relevant in the context of global environmental concerns.

However, Neo-Determinism also has its limitations. It may not fully capture human potential in extreme environments, may lead to a pessimistic outlook on development, and can appear less relevant in highly industrialized settings. Moreover, by focusing heavily on environmental and technological factors, it sometimes overlooks social and cultural influences, which are crucial to understanding human-environment interactions.

Overall, Neo-Determinism serves as a valuable framework for analyzing how environmental factors shape human actions and vice versa. Its merits and demerits reveal both the strengths and limitations of this approach, reminding us that while nature influences human activity, human agency and innovation remain powerful forces in shaping the course of development.

Human geography is a sub-discipline of geography that focuses on the relationships between humans and their environment, emphasizing spatial patterns of human activity, cultural landscapes, and socio-economic processes. Over time, various theoretical and methodological approaches have shaped human geography, reflecting changes in philosophical thought, scientific inquiry, and societal transformations. These approaches provide different lenses through which geographers study human-environment interactions, social structures, and spatial organizations.

Humanistic Geography

It is an approach in human geography, distinguished by the central and active role it gives to human awareness and human agency, human consciousness and human creativity. It is an attempt at understanding meaning, value and the human significance of life events. The revival of humanism in geography in the 1970s owed much to a deep dissatisfaction with the more mechanistic models developed during the quantitative/spatial science revolution.

For this reason, its early steps were taken alongside behavioural geography. But the two soon parted company and humanistic geography came to recognise the essential ‘subjectivity’ of both the investigator and the investigated in ways which departed from the formal structures of behaviourism.

Indeed, humanistic geography shared in the more general critique of positivism’s claim to ‘objectivity’ (in which behavioural geography was itself inculcated). It came to be represented as a form of criticism through which geographers can be made more aware and cognizant of many of the hidden assumptions and implications of their methods and research, rather than as a coherent and robust methodology for the ‘post-behavioural revolution’ in geography. But humanism was intended to be more than just a critical philosophy.

Anne Buttimer (1978) attempted to bring forward the tradition of Vidal de la Blache, and argued that historical and geographical studies go together. She emphasised the need to understand each region and its inhabitants from the ‘inside’ (that is, on the basis of local perspective) and not from the perspective of the researching ‘outsider’. There undoubtedly are affinities between the French School of la geographie humaine and humanistic geography.

Idealist Approach

Leonard Guelke (1981) advocated an idealist approach, and expressed his ideas to historical geographers, as a counter to the arguments that they should adopt the approaches and techniques of positivism. He points out, ‘it is obvious that quantitative techniques will often be useful, but statistical methods put in harness with positivist philosophy is a dangerous combination.

Historical geographers need to rethink not their techniques but their philosophy. This can be best achieved by moving from problem-solving contemporary applied geography, towards the idealist approach widely accepted by historians’. A well-verified idealist explanation will be one in which a pattern of behaviour can be shown to be consistent with certain underlying ideas.

The idealist philosophy combines two positions, according to Guelke:

(a) A metaphysical argument that mental activity has a life of its own which is not controlled by material things and processes; and

(b) An epistemological argument that the world can only be known indirectly through ideas, and all knowledge is ultimately based on an individual’s subjective experience of the world, and comprises mental constructs and ideas. There is no ‘real’ world that can be known independently of the mind. Positivist spatial science is thus criticised because it believes in the existence of a real world, the nature of which it seeks to explain via general laws of behaviour.

Behavioural geography was equally criticised, not for its response to perceived images and subjective evaluation, but because of two assumptions within this field that:

(a) Identifiable environmental images exist which can be measured accurately; and that

(b) There are strong relationships between revealed images and preferences and actual (real world) behaviour.

Such an approach, according to Bunting and Guelke, puts human geography into a single-cause model, much like the earlier environmental determinism, and if one accepted this model, research in behavioural geography has failed to validate it. They argue for an idealist approach, which focuses on overt behaviour and its interpretation—in searching for the truth a scholar conducts a critical dialogue with his evidence and in due course he puts the results before his colleagues for their appraisal.

Guelke considered that geographers should attempt to discover what the decision-maker believed and not why he believed it. Thus, the human geographer does not need to develop theories, since the relevant theories which led to the action under study already existed in the minds of the decision-makers.

Hays (1979) points out the inherent weaknesses in the idealist approach that it ignores the possibility of either unconscious or sub-conscious behaviour. He further points out that the objective facts must influence behavioural outcomes, in addition to the thoughts of the actors. To him, idealism acts as a reductionist, but the world is more than a large number of independent decision-makers.

Mabogunje also criticises the idealist approach of Guelke, and argues that such a retreat from objective theory formulations as a means of seeking explanation to certain events would exclude from our consideration the exploration of the consequences of social actions.

Instead of retreating to a focus of particular cases, seeking special explanation for each situation in which a different value system can be shown to be operative, the geographers should attempt to build better theories encompassing these differences in value systems. Some scholars have expressed doubts as to how an idealist interpretation could be verified.

Hermeneutic Approach

Idealism implies one type of Hermeneutic Approach, which is the theory of interpretation and clarification of meaning. It took its place in the German tradition of ‘Geisteswissenchaften’, the human sciences.

Its arguments were then developed to embrace the reader (or interpreter) as well. The dialectic between the subject and the object leads on to what has been called ‘double hermeneutics’. In geography, hermeneutics has been formally employed in a similarly general fashion to contest the epistemology of positivism and hence to reject the exclusive claims of spatial science.

The critical impulse which hermeneutics entails has been generalised through claims for a presuppositional approach in human geography capable of giving direction to its emerging social conscience.

However, hermeneutics has much to offer to regional geography. On the one hand, it can provide the epistemology for a self-reflective, historical, geographical science of the region. On the other hand, it has specific contribution to make concerning the characteristics of the Earth, space and place, culture and especially, language, and thus it could be a means of reconstructing regional geography.

Phenomenological Approach

Phenomenology has attracted more attention among human geographers than idealism. The term was first used by Sauer as early as 1925, but it had only become widely known during 1970s. It was Relph who first attempted to introduce a phenomenological approach, when he pointed out that the basic aim of phenomenology is to present an alternative methodology to the hypothesis-testing and theory building of positivism, an alternative grounded in humankind’s ‘lived’ world of experience.

Phenomenologists argue that there is no objective world independent of man’s existence—all knowledge proceeds from the world of experience and cannot be independent of that world – ‘Idealism’, on the other hand, accepts that there is a real world outside the individual’s consciousness.

Kirk (1963) recognised two separate, but not independent environments:

(a) ‘Phenomenal environment’, which is the totality of the Earth’s surface, and

(b) ‘Behavioural environment’, which is the perceived and interpreted portion of the phenomenal environment.

Phenomenology in human geography is somewhat concerned with the phenomenal environment. The contents of that environment are unique to every individual, for each of its elements is the result of an act of intentionality; it is given meaning by the individual, without which it does not exist, but with which it influences behaviour. Phenomenology is the study of how such meanings are defined. It involves the researcher seeking to identify how the individual structures the environment in an entirely subjective way.

One of the well-known phenomenologists was Yi-Fu Tuan (1971), to whom geography is the mirror of man and reveals the essence of human existence and striving. To know the world is to know oneself, just as careful analysis of a house reveals much about both the designer and the occupant.

The study of landscapes is the study of the essence of the societies which mould them in just the same way as the study of literature and art reveals much of human life. Such study is clearly based in the humanities rather than in the social or physical sciences.

According to him, ‘Humanistic geography achieves an understanding of the human world by studying people’s relation with nature, their geographical behaviour as well as their feelings and ideas with regard to space and place. Scientific approaches to the study of man tend to minimise the role of human awareness and knowledge. Humanistic geography, in contrast, specifically tries to understand how geographical activities and phenomena reveal the quality of human awareness’.

There are five basic themes in Tuan’s humanistic geography:

(1) The nature of geographical knowledge and its role in human survival;

(2) The role of territory in human behaviour and the creation of place identities;

(3) The interrelationships between crowding and privacy, as mediated by culture;

(4) The role of knowledge as an influence on livelihood; and

(5) The influence of religion on human activity. Such concerns are best developed in historical and in regional geography; their value to human welfare is that they clarify the nature of the experience. ‘The model for the regional geographers of humanistic leaning is … the Victorian novelist who strives to achieve a synthesis of the subjective and the objective’.

Buttimer (1976, 282) also favoured phenomenology, as a path to understanding, on which informed planning can be built. ‘It could elicit a clearer grasp of value issues surrounding one’s normal way of life, and an appreciation of the kinds of education and socialization which might be appropriate for persons whose lives may weave through several mileux.’

Berry (1973) also supported the phenomenological orientation, calling for a view of the world from the vantage of process metageography. By metageography is meant that part of geographic speculation which deals with the principles lying behind perceptions of reality, and transcending them, including such concepts as essence, cause and identity.

Entrikin argues that ‘the humanistic approach is best understood as a form of criticism’. Whereas the positivist/quantitative movement was characterised by a great numerical superiority of practitioners over preachers, the phenomenological movement (like the idealist) has been characterised by the converse—much preaching and little practice.

However, humanistic geography has moved far from the position defined by Entrikin. It has moved from its early attack on positivism to make an assault on structuralism, and at the same time, it has developed a much more incisive methodology for empirical investigation.

Johnston (1986) distinguishes two basic streams of work. The first stream is characterised by a self-conscious drive to connect with that special body of knowledge, reflection and substance about human experience and human expression, about what it means to be a human being on this Earth, namely, the humanities.

The second stream is, perhaps, more self-consciously theoretical—in fact one of its central concerns is to clarify the ‘theoretical attitude’ itself. It draws on a range of constraints derived from the human and social sciences, most usually from existentialism and phenomenology, and from ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism.

Humanistic geography, therefore, appears to be concerned either with the study of individuals and their construction of phenomenal environments, or with the analysis of landscapes as repositories of human beings. As such, it may be considered separate from the subject matter of such human geography, notably behavioural geography, and its investigation of everyday activity within environments (most of them man-made). The phenomenological perspective has been adapted to such work, in the writing of Schultz on what he terms the ‘taken for granted’ world.

Much of everyday behaviour is unconsidered, in that it involves no original encounters. The behaviour is habitual, because all of the stimuli encouraged are processed as examples of particular types. Those types are not externally defined for the individual, but are created by him.

The phenomenology of the ‘taken for granted’ world is the study of those individually-defined typifications of the unconsidered ‘world of social reality’ rather than ‘a fictional non-existing world’ constructed by the scientific observer.

It may be that interactions within communities lead to common typifications. Quantitative methods may be used to identify the common elements, but as descriptive tools only. Quantification is not tied to positivism except when it is used to suggest laws and other generalisations.

Humanistic geography is based on a profound critique of positivist work, both that which makes major assumptions about the nature of decision­ making and that which seeks inductive laws of human behaviour which can be scientifically verified.

Its argument is for an understanding of man as a ‘living, acting, thinking being’. It is contended that the human condition can only be indicated by humanistic endeavour, for attitudes, impressions and subjective relation to places, and the sense of place, cannot be revealed by positivist research.

Behavioural Geography

In contrast to humanistic geography, Behavioural Geography may be seen as a developing criticism, from within the ‘quantitative’ movement, starting from disillusionment with theories based upon the concept of ‘economic man’.

It is an approach to human geography, and in particular to the processes responsible for human spatial behaviour, which especially draw on behaviouralism, or on cognition, as a key to understanding human spatial behaviour.

Behavioural geography treats man as a responder to stimuli. It seeks to identify how different individuals respond to particular stimuli (and also how the same individual responds to the same stimulus in different situations) to isolate the correlates of those varying responses to build models that can predict the probable impact of certain stimuli. The end-product is the input to processes aimed at either providing environments to which people respond in a preferred way or at changing the stimuli.

Behavioural geography has maintained strong ties with the positivist/spatial science tradition. Data are collected from individuals, but there almost all are concerned with the conscious elements in action; they are usually aggregated in order to allow statistically substantive and significant generalisations to be made about spatial behaviour, almost certainly in the context of the normative model of the spatial science school.

Though it was once assumed to be a ‘behavioural backlash’ to a conventional spatial science, behavioural geography was really a ‘logical outgrowth’ of the commitment to positivism enshrined in the quantitative revolution.

Kates (1962) was a major exponent of the behaviouristic approach. In his study of the flood-plain management, he said, ‘the way men view the ranks and opportunities of their uncertain environments plays a significant role in their decisions as a resource management’. Kates developed a scheme which seemed to have relevance to a wide range of behaviours.

His scheme was based on four assumptions:

1. Men are rational while taking decision:

Such a decision may be either prescriptive—describing how men should behave—or the descriptive of actual behaviour. The latter appears to be the most fruitful, both for understanding past decisions and for predicting those yet to be made. Decisions are made on a rational basis, but in relation to the environment as it is perceived by the decision-maker, which may be quite different from either ‘objective reality’ or the world as seen by the researcher.

2. Men make choices:

Many decisions are either trivial or are habitual so that they are accorded little or no thought immediately before they are made. Some major decisions regarding environment and its use may also be habitual, but such behaviour usually develops only after a series of conscious choices has been made. This leads to a stereotyped response to similar situation in the future.

3. Choices are made on the basis of knowledge:

Only very rarely can a decision-maker bring together all the information relevant to his task, and frequently he is unable to assimilate and use all that he has.

4. Information is evaluated to pre-determined criteria:

In habitual choice, the criterion is what was done before, but in conscious choice the information must be weighed according to certain rules.

Kates’ study aimed at understanding why people choose to live in areas which are prone to flooding. Their information was based on their knowledge and experience, and they could be scaled according to the certainty of their perceptions regarding further floods. In justifying their decisions, most were boundedly rational, and had made conscious choices in order to satisfy certain objectives.

It was Julian Wolpert who introduced many human geographers to the behaviourist alternative to the normative approaches then quite popular. In his paper, entitled ‘ The decision process in spatial context’, published in the Annals of the Association of American Geographers (1964), he compared actual and potential labour productivity on farms in Central Sweden. He observed that the sample farm population did not achieve profit maximisation, nor were its goals solely directed to that objective. The farmers were ‘spatial satisfiers’ rather than ‘economic men’.

Wolpert further continued this theme with studies of migration, aiming to model the decision-making which is behind the patterns of migration reported in census volumes and analysed by spatial scientists. He found the gravity model inadequate as a representation of such flow patterns.

To him, such individual has an action space—the set of place utilities which the individual perceives and to which he responds—whose contents may deviate considerably from that portion of the ‘real world’ which it purports to represent. Once the first decision—to migrate—has been made, then the action space may be changed as the potential mover searches through it for potential satisfactory destination If necessary, he extends the space if no suitable solution to the research can be found.

Undoubtedly, Wolpert’s papers heralded the development of behavioural geography. His behavioural approach has focused on topics related to decision-making in spatial contexts. Wolpert and his associates also prepared pioneering papers, related to political decision-making, applying the approach he set forth in his first work. Regarding the distribution of certain artefacts in the landscape, Wolpert pointed out that the location of a public facility, for example in an urban area, frequently is the product of policy compromise.

The aim in behavioural geography has been to derive alternative theories to those based on economic man. These theories are ‘more concerned with understanding why certain activities take place rather than what patterns they produce in space’.

Here the researcher uses the real world from a perspective of those individuals whose decisions affect locational or distributional pattern. He tries ‘to derive sets of empirically and theoretically sound statements about individual, small group, or mass behaviour’. Man is considered an active decision-maker, not a reactor to particular institutionally-created stimuli.

It may be noted that the initial interest in resource management was followed by an extension from environmental perception and decision-making into aspects of attitudes and motivation. These were applied to studies of migration, the diffusion of innovations, political behaviour (especially voting), perception, choice behaviour, and spatial search and learning.

‘By studying behavioural processes in these contexts, the aspiration was to increase geographer’s understanding of how spatial patterns evolve, thereby complementing their existing ability to describe such pattern. Morphological laws and systems are insufficient of themselves for understanding; the amalgamation of concepts about decision-making taken from other social sciences with geography’s spatial variable would allow development of process theories that could account for the morphologies observed’.

One aspect of behavioural geography has been the concept of mental map. This refers to the images of place, ‘mentally stored by individuals and drawn upon as resources in their interpretation of spatial desirability, their organisation of spatial routines, and their decision-making transaction as satisficing agents. Mental maps are an amalgam of information and interpretation reflecting not only what an agent knows about places but also how he or she feels about them’.

Mental maps are important to geographers not only as a means of examining an individual’s areas of spatial preference, but also as an insight into the processes whereby decisions are made, opportunities perceived and goals determined and satisfied.

‘If we grant that spatial behaviour is our concern, then the mental images that men hold of the space around them may provide a key to some of the structures, patterns and processes of man’s work on the face of the Earth’. Such maps are useful, it is believed, not only in the analysis of spatial behaviour, but also in the planning of the social investment.

According to Downs (1970), there may be two other approaches to the study of environmental images:

(a) The ‘structural approach’ which inquiries into the nature of the spatial information stored in people’s minds and which they use in their day- to-day affairs; and

(b) The ‘evaluative approach’ in which the question is, what factors do people consider important about their environment, and having estimated the relative importance of these factors, how do they employ them in their decision-making activities. With this evaluative approach, geographers moved into the wider field of cognitive mapping.

On the methods in behavioural geography, Johnston points out, ‘The behaviouristic approach is an inductive one, with the aim being to build general statements out of observations of ongoing processes…. In terms of the accepted route to scientific explanation … behavioural geography involved moving outside the accepted cycle procedure to input new sets of observations on which superior theories might be based. In doing this, the behaviourists did not really move far from the spatial-science ethos. Indeed many of their methods were those of their predecessors; Gould’s mental map studies, for example, used the same technical apparatus as the factorial ecologies’.

However, Pred presented an alternative to theory building based on ‘economic man’ in his two-volume work Behaviour and Location (1969), and proposed the use of a behavioural matrix to provide a framework in which locational decision­ making could be analysed.

Axes of behavioural matrix are quantity and quality of information available and the ability to use that information; economic man is located in the bottom right-hand corner. Because of the nature and importance of information flows, the position on the axis depends in part on the decision-maker’s spatial location.

His position would reflect aspiration levels, experience and norms of any groups to which he belonged. Different people in different positions in the matrix would vary in their decisions; therefore two at the same position may act on different bases and in different ways. Individuals do not stay at the same position in the matrix, and spatial patterns are not static.

In the second volume of the book, Pred introduced a dynamic element by shifting individuals through the matrix. As they shift, and change their decisions, so the environment changes for others. As people learn, they both acquire better information, and become more skilled in its use.

They shift towards the bottom right-hand corner of the matrix, some of them in advance of others, who benefit from the activities of the ‘decision leaders’. The unsuccessful are gradually eliminated, so that with time a concentration of good decision ­makers close to the economic man position evolves.

But changes in the external environment produce parametric shocks, which result in decision-­makers becoming less informed and less certain; as a consequence they are shifted back towards the upper left-hand corner, and another learning cycle begins. As long as parametric shocks occur more frequently than the learning experience takes, an optimal location pattern will never emerge, except perhaps by chance.

Harvey (1969) criticised the model of the behavioural matrix, finding it ambiguous, unoperational and an over-simplification of the complex nature of behaviour. He also expressed scepticism about the viability of a behavioural location theory. Instead, Harvey suggested two alternatives to behavioural location theory— further development of normative theory and the construction of a stochastic location theory.

To him, both these approaches offered more immediate pay­offs in terms of understanding spatial patterns than did behavioural efforts, because of the conceptual and measurement problems of the latter. Curry (1967) favoured the stochastic approach, while Weber (1972) attempted to model locational approaches.

The behavioural approach has not brought about a revolution away from the spatial science paradigm; in effect it has become an attachment to it. Behavioural geography is now widely accepted within the positivist orientation.

It seeks to account for spatial pattern within the environment (both man-made and natural) by establishing generalisations about man-environment interrelationships, and then using these as a basis for change through environmental planning activities that ‘modify the stimuli which affect the spatial behaviour of ourselves and others’.

The behavioural approach, therefore, is based on four major assumptions, according to Gold (1980):

1. The environment in which an individual acts is that which he perceives, which may well differ markedly from the true nature of the real world.

2. Individuals interact with their environments, responding to them and reshaping them.

3. The focus of study is the individual, not the group.

4. Behavioural geography is multi-disciplinary.

The behaviourist approach appears to consist of two approaches:

(a) The first is based on the study of overt behaviour using the traditional positivist formulation of dependent variables influenced by independent variables. This approach has involved the widespread application of statistical techniques,

(b) The second approach is based on attempts to identify the mental constructs that lie behind overt behaviour. However, little has been achieved in the second approach, i.e. linking cognitive schemata to behaviour, and thus extending the predictive models of the first approach.

‘In the early 1960s and 1970s, therefore, behavioural studies in geography typically examined the ways in which information is (selectively) abstracted, structured and stored in mental maps; fed into and channeled through decision-making systems, as individuals or corporations make diagonal moves through a notional behavioural matrix at movements in a recursive learning process; and disclosed in patterns of spatial behaviour through the analysis of revealed spatial preference and the reconstruction of individual- action-space’.

Time-Space Geography

Related to the behaviouralist tradition, and somewhat also to the humanistic heritage, is Hagerstrand’s Time-Space Geography. It may be seen as a critique, not so much of the ‘quantitative movement’ of the important aspects of social research in general.

It conceives of time and space as providers of ‘room (rum) for ‘collateral processes’. Time-space geography emphasises the importance of continuity and connectivity for sequences of events which necessarily take place in ‘situations bounded in time and space and whose outcomes are mutually modified by their common localization’.

An important aspect of time-space geography is that time and space are both regarded as resources which constrain activity. Any behaviour which requires movement involves the individual or group traversing a path through space and time. Movements along the horizontal axis indicate spatial traverses while those along the vertical axis mark the passage of time. Any journey, termed a lifeline by Hagerstrand, thus involves movement along both axes simultaneously.

Time-space geography is based upon four basic assumptions:

1. Space and time are resources on which individuals have to draw in order to realise particular projects.

2. The realisation of any project is subject to three constraints:

(a) ‘Capability constraints’, which restrict the activities of individuals through their own physical capabilities. They derive large measures from the individuals’ livelihood position,

(b) ‘Coupling constraints’, which operate to require certain individuals and groups to be in particular places at stated times. Such constraints define space- time boundaries,

(c) ‘Authority or steering constraints’, which impose certain conditions of access to and modes of conduct within particular space-time domain. Together, these three define the time-space prism (Fig. 15.1) which contains all the available lifeline paths for an individual starting at a certain location and needing to return there at a given time.

3. These constraints are interactive rather than additive and together they delineate a series of possibility boundaries which mark out the paths available for individuals to fulfil particular projects. These boundaries correspond to an underlying and evolving logic or structure whose disclosure requires a way of dealing with projects in space-time terms of considerable conceptual precision.

4. Within these structural templates, competition between projects for free paths and open space- times is the central problem for analysis and is mediated by specific institutions which seek to maintain an essential space-time coherence.

Time-space geography is often described as a ‘situational ecology’ concerned to incorporate certain essential biotic and ecological predicates within human geography and social theory. It has the potential for throwing new light on some of the very different kinds of questions customarily posed by ‘old-fashioned’ regional and historical geographers, as well as ‘modern’ human geographers.

Time-space geography is a challenge to turn to the ‘choreography’ of individual and collective existence—to reject the excesses of inter- and intra-disciplinary specialisation for a concern with collateral processes. It provides a method of mapping spatial behaviour and at the same time represents a reorientation of scale, away from aggregate data towards studies of individual behaviour. Hagerstrand’s time-space geography appears to be essentially humanistic, aimed to provide insight into what is especially human in man’s nature, and elucidates the specific human situation.

Human Ecology

One aspect of the critical revolution in the mid- 1960s was the revival of Human Ecology, the application of ecological concepts to the study of the relations between people and their physical and social environment. It was a logical extension of the system of thought and the techniques of investigation developed in the study of man.

Reacting to the contention of Eyre and Jones (1966) that human ecology was aimed to launch a deliberate assault on the quantitative revolution, Stoddard attempted to remove and/or reconcile the confusion by his translation of human ecology into systems analysis.

It is this focus on the location of people within the wider ecosystem that has characterised most recent studies in geography. However, Chorley (1973) finds the traditional ecological model inadequate, because human geography is no simple extension of biogeography. To him, the ecological model may fail as a supposed key to the general understanding of the relations between modern society and nature, because it casts social man in too subordinate and ineffectual a role.

It is because of time-space geography of Hagerstrand that human ecology received explicit recognition in the contemporary geographic studies. He defined his theoretical system as ‘space-time ecology’. His so-called ‘web model’ of space-time interaction should, in principle, be applicable to all aspects of biology from plants to animals to people. Its central subject matter, in fact, is to incorporate certain essential biotic and ecological predicates within human geography and to bridge the gap between biological and human ecology.

Holt-Jenson (1981) argues that those who describe geography as human ecology have often defined the concept too narrowly and have presented studies of man’s relationships to his environment as if it only encompasses man’s relationship with nature and not to his total physical and social environment.

Kirk (1963) described the geographical environment in terms which may possibly provide a useful starting point for a discussion of systems in which both ecological and social science theories and concepts may be relevant.

Welfare Geography

One of the distinct consequences of the ‘critical revolution’ in the contemporary human geography was the emergence/development of Welfare Geography in the 1970s. It is an approach to human geography that stresses on questions of inequality.

The welfare approach emerged from the radical reaction to the quantitative and model-building emphasis of the 1960s, which was thought to be insufficiently concerned with contemporary problems. It was developed as a possible reaction to the positivist/spatial science tradition.

During the 1960s, a lot of research was reported, under the general title of factorial ecologies, but only in the 1970s was the factorial ecology set of procedures adapted to the task of mapping social welfare on any significant scale.

A movement towards the welfare approach in the contemporary human geography was in fact heralded by D. M. Smith and P. L. Knox. Smith’s work, The Geography of Social Well-being in the United States (1973) was prepared in the light of American social indication movement and the growing belief there that gross national product (GNP) and national income are not necessarily direct measures of the quality of life in its broadest sense.

His aim was to initiate the collection and dissemination of territorial social indication, to point out the extent of discrimination by place of residence which occurs in the United States. Knox (1975) stated that it was a fundamental objective for geography to map social and spatial variations in the quality of life, both as an input to planning procedures and as a means of monitoring policies aimed at improving welfare.

Smith and Knox set forth the tradition of the welfare approach in geography in an organised manner. As Chisholm stated, their works represented the geographer as a ‘delver’ and ‘dovetailer’, as a provider of information on which more equitable social planning could be based.

A number of such works, suggesting spatial policies for social improvements, were done in the 1970s. These works carried forward human geography towards ‘welfare’ issues such as poverty,
hunger, discrimination, crime, medical care, racial tension and access to social services. This corresponded to a major shift in societal concern, from narrow economic criteria of development to broader aspects of the quality of life.

The basis of the welfare approach is in ‘who gets what, where and how’. The present states of society, with respect to ‘who gets what and where’ may be represented by extension of the abstract formulation of welfare economics, and the practical objective is to give it empirical substance. The welfare approach in geography requires the development of social indication for the empirical identification of social inequality and injustice in territorial distribution.

This may combine particular elements of social well-being in a composite measure. The method in welfare geography essentially appears to be descriptive, because descriptive research provides a basis for evaluation of social well-being. However, the early preoccupation with descriptive research in welfare geography has now given way to more process-oriented work on the question of how inequality arises.

Although originally proposed as an alternative framework for human geography, the welfare approach has now been merged with other lines of inquiry within geography directed towards the fundamental problems of inequality.

Implicit in welfare approach is a recognition that the issues in question extend beyond the limits of single discipline, and in fact render-disciplinary boundaries increasingly irrelevant. The welfare approach logically requires a holistic social perspective. Welfare geography attempts to make human geography more relevant to contemporary social problem.

Radical Geography

‘Whereas welfare geography works in principle within the framework of existing economic and social system, radical geography which has been established more recently, calls for both revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice’.

Radical geography appears to be an outcome of a ‘new critical revolution’ in the contemporary human geography, which seemed to have occurred largely as a result of the critiques of positivist/spatial science tradition in human geography.

As a holistic, revolutionary science, Marxism provides a film theoretical base for the radical movement in geography. Marxism offers an opportunity to develop an integrated comprehension of reality as a whole. To Harvey (1973), Marxist theory provides the key to understanding capitalist production from the position of those not in controls of the means of production—an enormous threat to the power structure of the capitalist structure. It not only provides an understanding of the origin of the present system, with its many-faceted inequalities, but also propounds alternative practices which would avoid such inequalities.

The Marxist theory renounced that the scientific laws of society are eternal. This view sharply contrasted with the claim of positivist science that scientific laws are universal in space and time. Economic laws are not eternal laws of nature, but historical laws appear and disappear. Society has inbuilt conflicts in it which tend to resolve themselves by change both in practice and in theory.

Science and scientific development, according to the Marxist theory, must be understood in relation to social reality, To Harvey (1973), the essential difference between positivism and Marxism is that positivism simply seeks to understand the world, whereas Marxism seeks to change it.

For Peet (1977), the Marxist science begins with a material analysis of society, proceeds through a critique of capitalist control of the material base of society and proposes solutions in terms of social ownership of that material base.

The growing disillusionment in the American society, partly as a result of the Vietnam War, social inequalities and injustice, racial tension, and the unresponsive attitude of the authority to the needs of the under-privileged, on the one hand, and the Marxist theory, on the other hand, formed a broad symbiosis for radical geography.

However, according to Peet (1977), radical geography developed largely as a negative reaction to the established disciplines, a reaction which was initially formulated within existing methods of positivism. By the early 1970s, the critique however, had developed a strong Marxist base, aiming to create a radical science, which seeks to explain not only what is happening, but also to prescribe revolutionary change. A journal of radical geography—Antipode was launched in 1969 at Clark University.

The first step in the development of a mature radical practice of geography was the emergence of a liberal viewpoint. This was an attempt to find more socially appropriate uses for the existing techniques and theories, and yet to maintain the basic ideas and values of the social system. When geographers began to question the ideology underlying the existing geographic models, they moved into the critique stage of development. Next came the extraction of elements-problems.

Failure on the part of the liberal geographers to offer meaningful solutions to the major socio­economic crisis in the United States prompted Harvey (1973) to offer a revolutionary theory, thereby overthrowing the current paradigm.

The immediate task, according to him, is nothing more than the self-conscious and aware construction of a new paradigm for social geographic thought through a deep and profound critique of our existing analytical constructs. The new paradigm would be built on a Marxist base, and it would achieve social reforms through the education process. The benefit of Marxist theory was that it can handle two crucial issues that positivist theory cannot—increase injustice, and heightened economic and social instability.

However, Peet (1977) has argued that the early ‘radical’ work by geographers in the late 1960s was liberal in its attitude. David Harvey in his book Social Justice and the City (1973) made a major contribution to the case for a Marxist- inspired, materialist theory development within geography. Peet also moved to a Marxist position replacing his earlier paper on poverty by a Marxist interpretation, based on the assumption that inequality is inherent in the capitalist mode of production.

As a mode of analysis, Marxism is a variant of the philosophy of structuralism which identifies three levels of analysis:

(a) The level of appearance or the super-structure;

(b) The level of processes, or the infrastructure; and

(c) The level of imperatives, or the deep structure.

Marxism has a materialist base. It argues that the infrastructure comprises a set of economic processes and most Marxist work concentrates on the processes operating within the capitalist mode of production. Marxist analysis seeks to identify the processes operating in the infrastructure and to relate them to the pattern in the super-structure. In human geography, this means deriving general theories of historical materialism that will account for particular patterns.

Marxist structuralism can also be presented as a variant of the realist philosophy of science which seeks to relate the contents of an empirical world to a set of infrastructural determinants—economic processes.

The Marxist/radical approach in geography has four basic components:

1. The first is the critique of positivist spatial science and behavioural geography, and of humanistic geography.
2. The second is to provide general theoretical frameworks, within which empirical work can be set.
3. Thirdly, there is work that seeks to establish how individuals act within the structural imperative.
4. And finally, there is detailed empirical work that seeks to understand particular aspects of the subject matter of human geography within the structuralist framework.

The radical geographers, with their concern for social values and political action, have rejected the traditional concept of geography. Although the radicals generally remain interested in the human/ environmental and spatial relationships, they spurn the systems of theory and methodology that are viewed as providing only partial accounts of reality and as serving the interests of a select social group or class.

Most radical geographers accept geography as a legitimate field of study and feel that it has much to offer in finding solution to the world problems. The radical geographer’s aim is the alteration of the operating societal processes by changing the relations of production.

Since radical geography is purely an American enterprise, it had no academic recognition in the former Soviet Union where its desirability and viability was doubted for not having a good understanding of Marxist-Leninist thought.

Though critical revolution in geography occurred side by side with the quantitative revolution in the 1960s and the early 1970s, as a possible reaction to the positivist spatial science tradition, but recent studies in humanistic geography, behavioural geography, time space geography, human ecology, welfare geography and radical geography reveal that there are some attempts towards some ‘revaluation’ of the positivist approach.

It is equally important to note that in geography, paradigms or rather schools of thought have not succeeded each other as Kuhn’s model suggests, but, to a large extent, continue to exist in parallel, whilst the new schools slowly absorb the older ones leaving some former contradiction to linger on within the new structure.

There is little evidence either of large-scale disciplinary consensus for any length of time about the merits of a particular approach or any of the revolutions that have been entirely consummated. Certainly the quantitative and theoretical developments followed by the critical and neo-critical revolutions have had a major impact, but there were many residuals of earlier paradigms. The failure to fit Kuhn’s model to contemporary trends in human geography leads to the conclusion that the model is irrelevant to this social science and perhaps to social science in general.